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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a judgment which is unconscionable for fraud, accident, or mistake
whereby defendant was prevented from setting up a meritorious de-
fense will be enjoined. But the power does not extend to relieve
from judgments on account of errors or irregularities on which the
judgment was founded.23 Although it would seem that the Federal
court could hardly expect, by accepting the prayer for relief as con-
clusive of the amount involved, to limit the state courts to this inter-
pretation, the language of the principal case suggests that a recovery
for more than the amount prayed for at the time removal was denied
would be deemed a fraud on the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. 24
For this reason the judgment might be enjoined.
JOE EAGLES.
Suretyship-Extent of Liability on Sheriff's Official Bond.
In State of North Carolina ex rel. Wintmer v. Leonard' the
relator was wrongfully shot by a North Carolina sheriff. Action was
brought in a Federal court on the sheriff's official "process bond,"
which contains a clause for the faithful execution of office. Held, a
demurrer to the complaint was properly sustained. Such a general
clause of faithfulness in all things in an official bond is limited to
the specific duties mentioned therein, i.e. in the "process bond" the
due execution and return of process, and the payment of money and
fees collected.
Wrongful acts of a public official which render him personally
liable to a person injured thereby have been placed in three catego-
ries : acts done by virtue of office, acts done under color of office, and
those done by the official in his private capacity. All courts hold that
the sureties on the officer's official bond are not liable for acts of the
latter type.2 Many courts hold that a bond conditioned for the faith-
2 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 41 Sup. Ct. 93, 65 L. ed. 205
(1920); National Surety Co. of N. Y. v. State Bank of Humboldt, 120 Fed.
593 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903); Horton v. Stegmyer, 175 Fed. 756 (C. C. A. 8th,
1910).
" Brady v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, supra note 1, ("Having
the right to determine the amount she would claim, the filing of a suit for such
amount in the State court was not in our opinion a fraud on the jurisdiction
of the Federal court.").
168 F. (2d) 228 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
' Feller v. Gates, 40 Ore. 543, 67 Pac. 416 (1902) (constable received money
from execution debtor under contract not to serve execution, the constable to
repay money on reversal of judgment on appeal. Held, a personal act, so sure-
ties on his official bond not liable for conversion of the money.); Citizen's
State Bank of Wheeler v. American Surety Co., 65 S. W. (2d) 778 (Tex.
1933) (sheriff filed list of fees, including several unlawful ones and received
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ful performance of the duties of office include only those acts done
by virtue of office,8 but the tendency of most courts is to include acts
done under color of office as well.4 The first named view involves a
distinction between acts done under color of office and those by virtue
of office, and the second, a distinction between acts done under color
of office and those done by the officer in his private capacity. The
factual distinctions thus made, however, have led to much variance
in authority as to the extent of the terms "by virtue of office" 5 and
"under color of office."
6
Unlike most jurisdictions North Carolina requires three bonds of
a sheriff: two conditioned specifically for the proper collection of
state and county taxes, respectively, and one conditioned specifically
for the due execution and return of process, and the payment of fees
and money collected, and generally "for the faithful execution of his
office as sheriff.'" 7 The concluding clause of the "process bond" has
been the subject of much controversy. The earlier cases held to the
narrow view that a general clause of faithfulness in all things in an
a deficiency certificate, which he sold to bank. Held, such sale was neither by
virtue nor under color of office, but merely a personal transaction of the
sheriff in his private capacity).
'Bassinger v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 58 F. (2d) 573
(C. C. A. 8th, 1932) (no recovery where plaintiff injured during arrest with-
out warrant, the sheriff believing he had committed a felony) ; State v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co. of Md., 147 Md. 194, 127 AtI. 758 (1925) (sheriff's bond not
liable for his unauthorized arrest and mistreatment of plaintiff on a charge of
having aided another to escape).
4 Kosowsky v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 245 Mich. 266, 222 N. W.
153 (1928) (sheriff unlawfully assaulted plaintiff and imprisoned him. Held,
bond is liable for nonfeasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance by sheriff, virtute
offici or colore officii.) ; Wieters v. May, 71 S. C. 9, 50 S. E. 547 (1905).
' Brown v. Weaver, 76 Miss. 7, 23 So. 388 (1898). Sheriff's bond liable for
deputy's act (of shooting misdemeanant fleeing to escape after arrest as hav-
ing been done by virtue of office); cf. Richards v. American Surety Co. of
N. Y., 171 S. E. 924 (Ga. 1933) (Deputy's shooting plaintiff to prevent escape
from arrest held* under color of office); MURFREE, OFFICIAL BONDS (1885)
471 (contending that where a man doing an act within the limit of his official
authority exercises that authority improperly or abuses the discretion placed in
him he is acting by virtue of office.)..
'Lewis v. Treadway, 211 Ky. 140, 277 S. W. 309 (1925) (if arresting
officer is armed with no writ, or an utterly void one, and there is no statute
which gives him authority to do the act without process, then there is no color
of office) ; cf. State v. Roth, 330 Mo. 105 49 S. W. (2d) 109 (1932) (if he
assumed to act as an officer, whether under a valid process, or a void one, or no
process whatsoever, the officer's bond is liable) ; see American Guaranty Co. v.
McNiece, 111 Ohio St. 532, 146 N. E. 77 (1924) (a dictum to the effect that
some courts hold the question of liability for wrongful acts done under color
of office is sui generis, and dependent upon the particular circumstances of each
case; State v. Freeman, 61 S. W. (2d) 459 (Tenn. 1933) (the term "under
color of office" implies an evil or corrupt motive).
7 N. C. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1931) §3930.
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official bond was limited to the specific duties mentioned therein. 8
There is also early North Carolina authority to the effect that such
a general clause merely requires the sheriff faithfully to execute the
specific duties of his office, and does not cover any abuse or usurpa-
tion of power.9
That the official bond, so construed, was insufficient f or public
security, and that legislative action broadening the scope of the bond
was needed was pointed out in several cases. 10 In 1883 Section 354
of the present Code was enacted, which provides in part, ". . . and
every such officer and the sureties on his official bond shall be liable
to the person injured for all acts done by said officer by virtue or
under color of office." This section was construed as broadening the
scope of the official bond so as to cover both acts done by virtue of
office and those done under color of office," with the latter term
liberally interpreted.
12
However, in Sutton v. Wiliam,, 13 decided in 1930, the court re-
verted to the older authority in holding that the general clause of the
"process bond" was limited to the specific duties which were pro-
vided for in the bond, and that even if not so limited the clause
merely requires the affirmative performance of the duties of office.
Although Section 354 and the cases based upon it were before the
court in the briefs of counsel, 14 no mention was made of such au-
thority in the court's opinion. The Federal court in the principal
case was thus justified in recognizing this decision as the latest pro-
nouncement of the local law. This case serves, however, to call
8 Crumpler v. Governor, 12 N. C. 52 (1826) ; Eaton v. Kelly, 72 N. C. 110
(1875); Holt v. McLean, 75 N. C. 347 (1876); see South v. Maryland, 18
How. 396, 15 L. ed. 433 (U. S. 1856).
'State v. Long, 30 N. C. 415 (1848) (no recovery where a sheriff took a
money deposit in lieu of a bail bond and refused to return on defendant's sur-
render and demand. Butts v. Brown, 33 N. C. 141 (1850) (sheriff's bond not
liable for a simple trespass committed by him under color of office) ; cf. State
v. Wade, 87 Md. 529, 40 Atl. 104 (1898).
"0 State v. Long, Butts v. Brown, both supra note 9; Holt v. McLean,
supra note 8.
-u State ex rel. Kivett v. Young, 106 N. C. 567, 10 S. E. 1019 (1890);
Joyner v. Roberts, 112 N. C. 114, 16 S. E. 917 (1893) ; Warren v. Boyd, 120
N. C. 56, 26 S. E. 700 (1897) ; State ex rel. Board of Com'rs. v. Sutton, 120
N. C. 298. 26 S. E. 920 (1897).
"Warren v. Boyd, supra note 11 (a constable's bond held liable for false
imprisonment of the plaintiff, even though done without legal process or color
of process).
199 N. C. 546, 155 S. E. 160 (1930) (sheriff's bond held not liable for
injury caused by negligence of a prisoner whom sheriff had wrongfully allowed
freedom as a trusty).
"So found by the Federal court in the principal case.
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attention to the conflicting lines of authority in North Carolina on
.he subject, and. to the need for definitive legislative action. While
a complete revision of the system of sheriff's bonds probably would
be best, it is submitted that the adoption of the following statute
would clarify the existing confusion and afford the public that de-
gree of security which seems desirable:
No clause for the faithful execution of his office, found in the
official bond of any public officer, shall be construed as limited to
the specific duties therein enumerated, but every such clause shall
render such officer and the sureties on his official bond liable to
any person injured by any wrongful or unauthorized act done by
said officer by virtue or under color of office.
J. A. KLEEMEIER, JR.
Trial-Power of Court to Dismiss an Action or Defense
Upon Opening Statement of Counsel.
Plaintiff, as administrator, brought an action to recover for the
death of his infant son, who was drowned after falling through an
unguarded hole in the defendant's wharf. It was contended that the
wharf, together with sandpiles thereon, brought the case within the
doctrine of attractive nuisance. After the opening statement of the
plaintiff's counsel, a verdict was directed for the defendant on the
ground that it was not stated in such opening that the alleged nui-
sance was visible from the highway. Held, error. It was inferable
from counsel's statement that the wharf and sandpiles could be read-
ily seen from a near-by street.1
The privilege of making an opening statement is afforded counsel
in order that he may outline his proofs to the jury and aid them in
their understanding of the case to be presented.2 It should be no
more than an informal summary of the intended evidence, and can-
not take the place of pleadings in determining the issues to be tried,3
I Best v. District of Columbia, 54 Sup. Ct. 487, 78 L. ed. 635 (1934).
' Paige v. Illinois Steel Co., 233 Ill. 313, 84 N. E. 239 (1908) ; State v.
Sheets, 89 N. C. 583 (1883); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND
PRocEDu1x (1929), §561. Nor should the counsel be permitted to argue the
merits under the guise of sketching his own case, Posell v. Herscovitz, 237
Mass. 513, 130 N. E. 69 (1921).
2Hunter Milling Co. v. Allen, 65 Kan. 158, 69 Pac. 159 (1902); Douglas
v. Marsh, 141 Mich. 209, 104 N. W. 624 (1905); Moore v. Dawson, 220 Mo.
App. 791, 277 S. W. 58 (1925). The party should not be confined in the intro-
duction of evidence to the statements made in the opening. Winfield v. Feder,
169 I1. App. 480 (1912); Marcy v. Shelburne Falls & C. St. Ry. Co., 210
Mass. 197, 96 N. E. 130 (1911); Petherick v. Order of the Amaranth, 114
Mich. 420, 72 N. W. 262 (1897).
